

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 153145  
ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011

DRAFTED BY: IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY: IO/UNA:JFTEFFT

S/S-O:KDSCOTT

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 153145

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 153145, ACTION ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC  
POSTS INFO LONDON PARIS 16 JUNE:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 153145

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: CF, XA, XJ

SUBJECT: S. AFRICA POLICY: SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVE-  
MENT.

1. SUMMARY: IN CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY,  
AMBASSADOR YOUNG HAS SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS  
TO ASSIST AFRICANS IN FINDING WAYS, WITHOUT DIRECT U.S.  
INVOLVEMENT, TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH AFRICAN PROBLEMS.  
RESPONDING ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
MOOSE SAID THE SECRETARY AND HE AGREED THAT CONSULTATIONS  
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WITH SENIOR AFRICAN LEADERS CONCERNING PROBLEM-SOLVING  
WOULD BE DESIRABLE IN ADVANCE OF THE OAU MEETING IN KHARTOUM.  
HE COMMISSIONED THE DEPARTMENT TO BEGIN A STUDY OF SPECIFIC  
IDEAS, AND SUGGESTED DEPARTMENT SOLICIT COMMENTS FROM THE  
FIELD IN THIS REGARD. END SUMMARY

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE CONTENT OF THE CABLE SENT TO THE

PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM ANDREW YOUNG JUNE 14:

BEGIN TEXT:

A. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT ALLOW THE AFRICANS TO  
ESCAPE THE LESSON OF THE SHABA. IT IS THE AFRICANS WHO HAVE

BY COMMISSION OR OMISSION PERMITTED THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS  
TO PLAY AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE MILITARY ROLE IN AFRICA,  
ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE SOME VERY IMPORTANT AFRICAN POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENTS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AFRICANS UNDERSTAND  
THAT TOLERANCE OF A SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE INEVITABLY WILL LEAD  
TO AFRICA'S BECOMING AN EAST-WEST COCKPIT IN WHICH OUTSIDE  
POWERS WILL CONTEND. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE COUNTRIES  
--SO VULNERABLE TO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION--UNDERSTAND PRE-  
CISELY THAT CUBAN INTERVENTION DOES LEGITIMIZE INTERVEN-  
TION BY OTHERS AND AFRICA'S LONG RUN INTEREST LIES IN  
STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO  
OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

B. I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT WE GO ON TO  
CHALLENGE THE AFRICANS AND TO SHOW THEM HOW TO MEET THAT  
CHALLENGE. BY THAT I MEAN WE SHOULD PRESS THE AFRICANS  
TO GO BEYOND SLOGANS AND TO ACT AS AFRICANS TO SOLVE  
AFRICAN PROBLEMS, AND TO DEVELOP THE KINDS OF AFRICAN  
APPROACHES REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THIS IS A TALL ORDER,  
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AND AT LEAST INITIALLY WILL REQUIRE A MORE REALISTIC  
ASSESSMENT BY AFRICANS OF THE OAU, WHICH HAS FAILED  
MISERABLY TO MEET AFRICAN NEEDS--WITNESS CHAD, ETHIOPIA/  
SOMALIA AND THE SHABA. WE SHOULD OFFER TO ASSIST AFRICANS  
IN FINDING WAYS, WITHOUT DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT, TO DEAL  
MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH AFRICAN PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE  
COULD ENCOURAGE THE AFRICANS TO DEVELOP INSTITUTIONS AND  
CODES OF CONDUCT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ETHNIC MINO-  
RITIES--THE MOST EXPLOSIVE POLITICAL PROBLEM IN THE CON-  
TINENT BECAUSE OF THE IRRATIONALITY OF COLONIAL BORDERS.  
THERE ARE SOME FOUNDATION STONES ON WHICH TO BUILD. AT  
THE LAST GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE NIGERIANS PROPOSED THE  
CREATION OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN REGIONS  
THAT NOW DID NOT HAVE THEM. WE COULD PUSH THIS IDEA ALONG  
WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST TASK OF THE AFRICAN COM-  
MISSION SHOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBI-  
LITIES OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN AFRICAN STATES.

C. IN THE AREA OF PEACEKEEPING WE SHOULD URGE THE AFRI-  
CANS TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THEIR  
INFLUENCE CAN COMMAND THE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE  
PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA. IN THE COUNCIL, THE AFRICANS CAN

MOST EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE RIVALRIES OF OUTSIDE POWERS.  
THE UN HAS THE EXPERIENCE AND STATUS TO DO THE JOB.

D. WE MIGHT ALSO CHALLENGE OTHER INVOLVED OUTSIDE POWERS  
TO AGREE TO ESTABLISH CERTAIN LIMITS ON THEIR ACTIONS.  
THUS, WE COULD DECLARE OUR INTENTION NEVER TO INTRODUCE  
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NEW MORE DANGEROUS FORMS OF CONVENTION-  
AL WEAPONS INTO AFRICA AND WORK TO EXACT SIMILAR PLEDGES

FROM OTHERS; WE COULD OFFER NEVER TO SUPPORT INTERVENTION  
IN AN AFRICAN STATE WITHOUT SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ENDO-  
RSEMENT PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION MADE THE SAME COMMIT-  
MENT.

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E. SPECIFICALLY WE MIGHT OFFER TO WORK TO STOP ALL INTER-  
VENTION IN THE ZAIRE-ANGOLA CONFLICT AND ATTEMPT TO  
SECURE BORDERS AGAINST ALL OVERT AND COVERT ATTACK.

F. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE COMPLEXITIES IN SUCH PRO-  
POSALS, BUT I URGE THAT YOU COMMISSION AN URGENT STUDY  
AIMED AT DEVELOPING SPECIFIC IDEAS, SUCH AS THE ONES I  
SUGGESTED, ON HOW AFRICANS CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY ACT TO  
DEAL WITH THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. THE STUDY SHOULD CONSIDER  
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS. IDEALLY, WE  
SHOULD DEVELOP OUR CONCLUSIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH  
NYERERE, OBASANJO, SADAT AND OTHER PRINCIPAL AFRICAN  
LEADERS IN ADVANCE OF THE KHARTOUM MEETING OF OAU HEADS  
OF GOVERNMENT AND THUS OFFER OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS ASSURING  
THAT THE FOCUS OF THAT MEETING WILL BE A SERIOUS EFFORT  
AT AFRICAN PROBLEM-SOLVING. END TEXT

3. ON JUNE 15 ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE RESPONDED, SAYING  
THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S  
CABLE AND AGREED THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR AFRICAN  
LEADERS REGARDING AFRICAN PROBLEM7SOLVING WOULD BE DESIR-  
ABLE IN ADVANCE OF THE KHARTOUM MEETING. MOOSE SAID THAT  
THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THE CRITICISM FROM SOME  
QUARTERS THAT WESTERN ACTION IN SHABA HAD BYPASSED THE OAU  
AND ALSO IN VIEW OF THE EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT THE U.S.  
SUPPORTED THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF A PAN-AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING  
FORCE. MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT A LIST OF AFRICAN LEADERS TO  
BE CONSULTED SHOULD GO BEYOND THOSE INCLUDED IN AMBASSADOR  
YOUNG'S CABLE.

4. HE CONCLUDED BY ASKING THE DEPARTMENT TO PREPARE WITH  
USUN A STUDY OF SPECIFIC IDEAS WHICH WOULD BE A USEFUL  
PRELIMINARY TO CONSULTATIONS. IN THIS REGARD HE ALSO ASKED  
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DEPARTMENT TO SOLICIT FROM AFRICAN POSTS COMMENTS ON AMB-  
ASSADOR YOUNG'S CABLE AND ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS THEY MIGHT  
HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. POSTS SHOULD RESPOND SOONEST BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.  
CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE. NEWSOM

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DRAFTED BY:EUR/WE:EMROWELL

APPROVED BY:EUR/WE - MR. ROWELL

S/S - MVKENNEDY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUDKFDQ/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0000

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY MADRID

S E C R E T STATE 153145

EXDIS

FOL STATE 153145 SENT INFO USUN JUNE 16, 1978 REPEATED TO  
YOU QUOTE

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 153145, ACTION ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC  
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1. SUMMARY: IN CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY, AMBASSADOR YOUNG HAS SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO ASSIST AFRICANS IN FINDING WAYS, WITHOUT DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT, TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH AFRICAN PROBLEMS. RESPONDING ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE SAID THE SECRETARY AND HE AGREED THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR AFRICAN LEADERS CONCERNING PROBLEM-SOLVING WOULD BE DESIRABLE IN ADVANCE OF THE OAU MEETING IN KHARTOUM. HE COMMISSIONED THE DEPARTMENT TO BEGIN A STUDY OF SPECIFIC IDEAS, AND SUGGESTED DEPARTMENT SOLICIT COMMENTS FROM THE FIELD IN THIS REGARD. END SUMMARY

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE CONTENT OF THE CABLE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY FROM ANDREW YOUNG JUNE 14:

BEGIN TEXT:

A. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT ALLOW THE AFRICANS TO ESCAPE THE LESSON OF THE SHABA. IT IS THE AFRICANS WHO HAVE

BY COMMISSION OR OMISSION PERMITTED THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS TO PLAY AN INCREASINGLY ACTIVE MILITARY ROLE IN AFRICA, ENOUGH TO INFLUENCE SOME VERY IMPORTANT AFRICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE AFRICANS UNDERSTAND THAT TOLERANCE OF A SOVIET/CUBAN ROLE INEVITABLY WILL LEAD TO AFRICA'S BECOMING AN EAST-WEST COCKPIT IN WHICH OUTSIDE POWERS WILL CONTEND. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE COUNTRIES --SO VULNERABLE TO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION--UNDERSTAND PRECISELY THAT CUBAN INTERVENTION DOES LEGITIMIZE INTERVENTION BY OTHERS AND AFRICA'S LONG RUN INTEREST LIES IN

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STRENGTHENING THE POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

B. I BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THEREFORE THAT WE GO ON TO CHALLENGE THE AFRICANS AND TO SHOW THEM HOW TO MEET THAT CHALLENGE. BY THAT I MEAN WE SHOULD PRESS THE AFRICANS TO GO BEYOND SLOGANS AND TO ACT AS AFRICANS TO SOLVE AFRICAN PROBLEMS, AND TO DEVELOP THE KINDS OF AFRICAN APPROACHES REQUIRED FOR THIS PURPOSE. THIS IS A TALL ORDER, AND AT LEAST INITIALLY WILL REQUIRE A MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT BY AFRICANS OF THE OAU, WHICH HAS FAILED MISERABLY TO MEET AFRICAN NEEDS--WITNESS CHAD, ETHIOPIA/ SOMALIA AND THE SHABA. WE SHOULD OFFER TO ASSIST AFRICANS IN FINDING WAYS, WITHOUT DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT, TO DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH AFRICAN PROBLEMS. FOR EXAMPLE, WE COULD ENCOURAGE THE AFRICANS TO DEVELOP INSTITUTIONS AND CODES OF CONDUCT TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ETHNIC MINORITIES--THE MOST EXPLOSIVE POLITICAL PROBLEM IN THE CONTINENT BECAUSE OF THE IRRATIONALITY OF COLONIAL BORDERS. THERE ARE SOME FOUNDATION STONES ON WHICH TO BUILD. AT THE LAST GENERAL ASSEMBLY THE NIGERIANS PROPOSED THE CREATION OF REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN REGIONS THAT NOW DID NOT HAVE THEM. WE COULD PUSH THIS IDEA ALONG WITH THE THOUGHT THAT THE FIRST TASK OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION SHOULD BE TO DEAL WITH THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN AFRICAN STATES.

C. IN THE AREA OF PEACEKEEPING WE SHOULD URGE THE AFRICANS TO HAVE RECOURSE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THEIR INFLUENCE CAN COMMAND THE RESOURCES NEEDED FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA. IN THE COUNCIL, THE AFRICANS CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE RIVALRIES OF OUTSIDE POWERS. THE UN HAS THE EXPERIENCE AND STATUS TO DO THE JOB.

D. WE MIGHT ALSO CHALLENGE OTHER INVOLVED OUTSIDE POWERS TO AGREE TO ESTABLISH CERTAIN LIMITS ON THEIR ACTIONS.

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THUS, WE COULD DECLARE OUR INTENTION NEVER TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR NEW MORE DANGEROUS FORMS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS INTO AFRICA AND WORK TO EXACT SIMILAR PLEDGES

FROM OTHERS; WE COULD OFFER NEVER TO SUPPORT INTERVENTION IN AN AFRICAN STATE WITHOUT SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION MADE THE SAME COMMITMENT.

E. SPECIFICALLY WE MIGHT OFFER TO WORK TO STOP ALL INTERVENTION IN THE ZAIRE-ANGOLA CONFLICT AND ATTEMPT TO SECURE BORDERS AGAINST ALL OVERT AND COVERT ATTACK.

F. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE COMPLEXITIES IN SUCH PROPOSALS, BUT I URGE THAT YOU COMMISSION AN URGENT STUDY

AIMED AT DEVELOPING SPECIFIC IDEAS, SUCH AS THE ONES I SUGGESTED, ON HOW AFRICANS CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY ACT TO DEAL WITH THEIR OWN PROBLEMS. THE STUDY SHOULD CONSIDER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY OPTIONS. IDEALLY, WE SHOULD DEVELOP OUR CONCLUSIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH NYERERE, OBASANJO, SADAT AND OTHER PRINCIPAL AFRICAN LEADERS IN ADVANCE OF THE KHARTOUM MEETING OF OAU HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND THUS OFFER OUR EFFORTS TOWARDS ASSURING THAT THE FOCUS OF THAT MEETING WILL BE A SERIOUS EFFORT AT AFRICAN PROBLEM-SOLVING. END TEXT

3. ON JUNE 15 ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE RESPONDED, SAYING THAT HE AND THE SECRETARY HAD DISCUSSED AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CABLE AND AGREED THAT CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR AFRICAN LEADERS REGARDING AFRICAN PROBLEM SOLVING WOULD BE DESIRABLE IN ADVANCE OF THE KHARTOUM MEETING. MOOSE SAID THAT THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THE CRITICISM FROM SOME QUARTERS THAT WESTERN ACTION IN SHABA HAD BYPASSED THE OAU  
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AND ALSO IN VIEW OF THE EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE FRENCH CONCEPT OF A PAN-AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING FORCE. MOOSE SUGGESTED THAT A LIST OF AFRICAN LEADERS TO BE CONSULTED SHOULD GO BEYOND THOSE INCLUDED IN AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CABLE.

4. HE CONCLUDED BY ASKING THE DEPARTMENT TO PREPARE WITH USUN A STUDY OF SPECIFIC IDEAS WHICH WOULD BE A USEFUL PRELIMINARY TO CONSULTATIONS. IN THIS REGARD HE ALSO ASKED DEPARTMENT TO SOLICIT FROM AFRICAN POSTS COMMENTS ON AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CABLE AND ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS THEY MIGHT HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT.

5. POSTS SHOULD RESPOND SOONEST BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.  
CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE. NEWSOM UNQUOTE VANCE

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## Message Attributes

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**Draft Date:** 16 jun 1978  
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**TAGS:** PEPR, CF, XA, XJ, US, (YOUNG, ANDREW)  
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**Type:** TE  
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